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Review Essay 
Social Management or Social Governance: A Review of Party and 
Government Discourse and why it Matters in Understanding Chinese 
Politics   
 
Abstract 
The political report given by Xi Jinping at the 19th National Party Congress in late 
2017 introduced the concept of “a social governance model based on co-construction, 
co-governance, and co-sharing.” This essay explores the use and interpretations of 
official discourse on governing society since the late 1980s to understand what is new 
about this concept. I examine key central documents and scholars’ interpretations of 
their language in order to analyse the changes in the Party’s stated thinking on 
governance, and to demonstrate the importance of central document analysis in 
understanding Chinese politics. I find that the term social governance does not have 
one clear, static meaning and that to argue otherwise would be misleading. Rather 
than developing in a linear way, as is often assumed, the concepts used in official 
discourse are found to be ambiguous and at times contradictory. This plays two 
important roles. It creates space for scholars to use official discourse as a channel for 
political participation, while at the same time facilitating the use of official language 
as technique for governing its users.  
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Central documents are a crucial resource in the analysis of Chinese politics. 
They signal priority issues to the entire Communist Party of China (CPC) and 
government, and contain the discourse that sets the vague but compelling boundaries 
which delineate how organizations and individuals can “legitimately” think and talk 
about their work and how they work in practice. In this essay, using two governance 
concepts as an example, I argue that engaging with the Chinese academic literature 
can demonstrate how central documents and political discourse are used as a 
governance technique by both Party and government. This discourse, and scholars’ 
use of it, creates a restrictive political participatory channel. When this is overlooked 
it can cause us to misunderstand, or miss the point, of much of the Chinese debate. Yu 
Keping has remarked that “using Chinese political key words as a starting point to 
analyse the shifts in politics and the changes in political discourse to observe real-life 
political processes, is an especially important perspective for analysing real politics in 
China” (2016, 4). Without knowledge of the evolving political discourse on a given 
topic, it is difficult to understand the necessarily artfully-articulated arguments of 
domestic scholars, which is a great weakness in our understanding of Chinese politics. 
As those interested in Chinese politics seek new ways to understand Chinese 
“governance” (Shue and Thornton 2017), this essay examines the role that political 
documents and a deeper engagement with the Chinese literature can play as an 
approach to doing just that. 
The essay begins by tracing the apparent shift, from the late 1980s to the present, 
in official discourse from social management (社会管理) to social governance (社会治
理). This demonstrates the development of the two terms as being initially vague, 
sometimes contradictory, and ultimately non-linear. It shows that the concrete 
meanings that we assume terms to have often do not exist, or at least are ephemeral, 
changing over time and in different contexts (Barthes 1994). This in turn suggests that 
instead of seeking definitive answers to what a term means it can be more useful to 
treat it as an amorphous vehicle that is given its concrete meaning further down the 
policy chain as different actors apply their own interpretations. It then surveys 
different approaches used in the Chinese-language literature to interpret these terms, 
showing the expanding and contracting space for interpreters to give concrete 
meaning to inherently vague or ambiguous concepts. The aim of this section is not to 
answer definitively what the original authors of political documents intended these 
terms to mean, but to demonstrate how the space for interpretation is used and can 
change. I then use examples of the “Party leadership” (党的领导) and “the people” (人
民) to show how concepts can be made more ambiguous by their context. Ultimately, 
political concepts, including the terms that are the focus of this paper,  are found to be 
grounds for political contention over which arguments about fundamental values and 
policy directions can be played out. But like other spaces where such contention can 
take place, this space is in a constant state of flux. 
 
Discourse of Social Management and Social Governance (1988-2018)  
 Central Committee third plenary sessions are generally thought to be a 
moment when decisions of exceptional importance are announced. In 1978, the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee shifted the Party’s focus from “class 
struggle” to “socialist modernization,” launching economic reforms. In 2013, the 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee announced that the ultimate 
objective of deepening reforms is to modernize the national governance system and 
governance capacity. In the Resolution of the latter session another term was given its 
first major public outing: “social governance.” This new term had, it appeared, 
replaced the seemingly inelegant “social management,” and was widely seen as being 
indicative of an “elevation” in thinking at the top. However, if we look closer, cracks 
appear in the apparently smooth linear progression. When single terms are coupled 
with a broader reading of political discourse, questions arise that lay assumptions bare.   
The term “social management” (社会管理) was first introduced formally in 
November 1993 (Zhou 2018, 331). The 14th Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session 
Resolution called for government’s “social management” functions to be strengthened 
to ensure the “normal running of the economy and decent social order.” In the years 
that followed, the term appeared sporadically, and was fleshed out with a little more 
detail.1 Documents from this period suggest that this vague term developed as a way 
of imagining government’s new functions now that it was pulling back from directly 
managing the market. It was also used loosely to refer to the need to manage society 
so as to maintain the stability needed for economic growth. 
Prior to this, the communiqué issued to explain the 1988 State Council Agency 
Reform Plan had referred not to “social management,” but to “social affairs.” It stated 
that “government cannot and need not take on all social affairs itself” and that it 
should instead rely on companies, associations, and social groups.2 The focus was on 
tentatively looking into using channels outside the structures of government to attend 
to social matters.  
However, in February 1989, Deng Xiaoping made the portentous statement 
that “The issue in China is that overriding everything else is the need for stability” 
(Deng 1993, 284). The tension among stability, reform, and development has been a 
dominant force over the last three decades in both Party and government policy. The 
preoccupation with stability has produced what some scholars call “stability-over-all 
thinking” (Wang et al. 2014, 17) and has remained stubbornly pervasive, with “leaders 
in each administration from Deng to Xi all treating ‘stability overrides all’ as the core 
value underpinning governance” (Yu 2018, 21). Notions of stability and how to 
maintain it may have changed, but the fact that this principle has continued to be “the 
main standard for assessing public governance” has not (Yu 2018, 21). It was in this 
broad context, in 1993, that “social management” made its debut. 
In 1998, five years after its first appearance, “social management” was 
established in that year’s State Council Agency Reform Plan as one of the three basic 
functions of government. Alongside it, and therefore viewed as separate functions, sat 
public services and macroeconomic regulation. This was also the first time that public 
services were treated as a basic government function (Jiang and Chen, 2018).  
It was after Hu Jintao became Party general secretary in 2002 that the term came 
to the fore. In late 2006, the 16th Central Committee’s Sixth Plenary Session Resolution 
included a full subsection on social management, stating the need to “innovate the 
 
1 For example, in a 1996 speech on managing risks to economic growth Jiang Zemin cited specific 
issues—urbanization and migrant workers—as increasing the difficulty of “social management.” 
2 This does not suggest the distinction between such organizations and government was clear. The 
plan calls for “filling them out” with “contingencies of government workers.”  
social management system” and “refine the social management setup (格局) whereby 
Party committees lead, government is responsible, society cooperates, and the public 
participates.”  
In an important speech in 2008, marking the 30th anniversary of reform and 
opening, Hu spoke of social management in the context of an appeal to work not only 
for economic efficiency but for social “fairness and justice.” In calling for 
“commitment to development that is for the people, relies on the people, and produces 
benefits shared by the people” he states, among a short list, “we are earnestly 
strengthening social management” (Hu 2008). It was around this time that 
experiments began across the country in “social management innovation” (社会管理
创新) (Yan 2017). 
In February 2011, the Central Party School held a seminar for provincial- and 
ministerial-level principal leading officials on “Social Management and its Innovation.” 
These seminars have, since 1999, become an important mechanism in the Party and 
government system. They are used as an opportunity for top central-level Party 
leaders to address top provincial- and ministerial-level government leaders on key 
and urgent issues (Zou 2014). That such a seminar was held on innovation in social 
management is a clear indication of the attention being given to this topic the year 
before the top leadership transition from Hu to Xi.  
It is commonly accepted that the first use of the term “social governance” (社
会治理) was in November 2013 under the Xi-Li first-term administration. However, it 
was actually first used in July 2012 by Hu Jintao. At another seminar for provincial- 
and ministerial-level principal leading officials, during the lead-up to the 18th 
National Party Congress, Hu stressed the need to “Move forward with political 
reform…developing broader and fuller people’s democracy,” seeing that “the people 
practice democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management, 
and democratic oversight” and “paying more attention to the important role of rule 
of law in national and social governance…guaranteeing social fairness and justice, 
and ensuring that the people, according to law, enjoy broad rights and freedoms” (Hu 
2012). At the 18th Party Congress in November that year, Hu added “rule of law 
guarantees” to the “social management setup” mentioned above.  
Around a year and a half after Hu Jintao first used “social governance,” in 
November 2013, Xi Jinping, now general secretary, used the term in the 18th Central 
Committee’s Third Plenary Session Resolution: “Innovations in social governance 
must focus on protecting the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of 
the people (最广大人民)…must comprehensively promote the Safe China Initiative 
[and] protect national security.” This emphasis in 2013 on social governance’s 
relationship to security and order forms an interesting contrast with its context in Hu’s 
seminar speech in 2012. 
In spite of a common assumption that “social governance” replaced “social 
management,” this is not true as a basic category of government functions. In fact, the 
18th Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session Resolution, in a section on “correctly 
executing government functions,” states the need to strengthen the duties of local 
governments in “social management.” 
Social management appears today as one of a list of five basic government 
functions, as we see in the 2018 “Deepening Party and State Agency Reform Plan” 
drafted by a team headed by Xi Jinping. This is an odd contrast with the 2018 
Government Work Report which, in its summary of the last five years, claims that 
government has, “with a commitment to performing government functions in 
accordance with the law, focused on strengthening and innovating social governance.” 
Given these apparent inconsistencies in the use of “management” and “governance” 
in political discourse, we must question our assumptions about the linear progression 
from one concept to the next and what this might mean.  
The often vague, ambiguous, and even apparently contradictory use of political 
language also highlights the need to understand and engage with the Chinese 
academic literature in a different way. Scholars and others outside the government 
(including the imperial) system have long “deployed literacy as a tool to project their 
influence, create new social roles, and generate forms of authority” (Thornton 2007, 
16). Perry Link (2013, 247) has illustrated how “people with different interests” might 
use a key phrase “under fundamentally different assumptions” and suggests that the 
ambiguity of “carefully crafted” terms and phrases can play important roles for 
officials at different levels in the Party and government apparatus, for example, 
enabling lower officials to “squeeze their own viewpoints into phrases that had 
already been anointed from above as ‘correct’” (2013, 248). This is also true of those 
outside the Party and government systems, with the ambiguity of political language 
being used by different actors to encourage an understanding of terms and concepts 
according to their own preferences. In reading the work of Chinese scholars that 
engages with political language and concepts, it can often be helpful to understand 
this work as a form of political participation in itself. Doing so can help us to navigate 
the subtleties and look beyond the surface of such writing, as important arguments 
can often be semi-hidden within official-like language and vapid filler passages.   
 
Interpreting Shifts in Political Discourse  
 This section reviews several interpretations by scholars and officials of the 
official discourse on social governance. What this demonstrates is, first, the ambiguity 
or vagueness of the terms to begin with, and second, the different purposes and 
pressures that shape Chinese actors’ interpretations at different times. I argue that 
engaging with the Chinese literature demonstrates how political discourse itself is 
used as a governance technique by the Party and government. It creates a restrictive 
political participatory channel for those who engage with this discourse. The risk of 
overlooking such dimensions is that we misunderstand, or miss the main point, of 
much of the Chinese academic debate.      
One of the most common approaches in addressing the shift to “governance” 
is to ask how changes in discourse can be reflected in practice (Sun 2015; Tang 2015; 
Zhou 2016). Scholars using this approach often do not give a direct or explicit 
interpretation of official terms, and do not seek to explain what the Party discourse 
means on its own terms. Rather, they utilize shifts in discourse to suggest favoured 
interpretations to discuss what terms could mean. Drawing on Andrew Mertha’s work 
(2009), we might think of this as a kind of unofficial re-framing of official framing. 
This is made possible by the vagueness and ambiguity of official discourse. Also, as 
Zhou Hongyun points out, there is a clear demand for such interpretations: “If 
systematic theoretical guidance is lacking, policy in practice will likely lose direction 
and not find a realistic way forward” (2016).  
The work of scholar Wang Ming, who has been researching civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in China for over two decades, is a good example of this 
approach. After the first appearance of “social governance,” Wang submitted a 
proposal on the subject to the 2014 session of the National Committee of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference using a line from a central Party document 
as his title. Wang framed his proposal, which argued the need for more power and 
resources to be channelled to CSOs, as a suggestion to help achieve the Party’s goal of 
“innovating social governance and unleashing social dynamism” (Wang 2014a). This 
was eleven years after his first proposal arguing for a pluralistic form of social 
governance in 2003 (Wang 2013).  
Also in 2014, Wang co-authored a book chapter with Lan Yuxin in which they 
repeat much of the main text on social governance from the 18th Central Committee’s 
Third Plenary Session Resolution and add to this their own interpretation. They argue 
that the aim of the reform in the social governance system is to “return governance to 
society” and shift away “from a Party- and government-guided model to reliance on rule 
of law and social self-governance” (italics added, Wang and Lan 2014, 140). This, today, 
seems like a bold interpretation because the Resolution itself, in its paragraph on 
“improving social governance methods,” called for “strengthening Party committee 
leadership, giving play to the main guiding role of government…[and] achieving 
government governance” (italics added). The space for public (publishable) 
interpretation that departs significantly from the original text seems at that time to 
have been greater than it was to later become. By the time the 19th Party Congress 
Report was issued, Wang had come to re-evaluate this interpretation. His analysis of 
new shifts in discourse was that “the one-character difference [from management to 
governance] shows clearly that the weight has shifted from Party-state-shouldered 
public management to consultative co-governance” (italics added, Wang 2018b). 
Consultative governance clearly places society in a passive position and is thus far less 
bold than Wang’s first interpretation of returning governance to society. A significant 
shift in the boldness of interpretation such as this is likely prompted not only by the 
specific wording of the political text being referred to, but by the broad political 
atmosphere for such interpretive exercises.3 
In engaging with the Chinese literature, it is worth noting that such 
interpretations often appear as a seamless combination of lines from political 
documents copied without a clear indication of their origin and the author’s own 
argument, which is not explicitly presented as one of a possible number of readings. 
What is in fact an argument for a scholar’s own favoured policy that uses political 
language to give the idea authority, legitimacy, and a protective barrier, can often be 
indistinguishable from an attempt to interpret political discourse “objectively.”     
Before social governance had “formally” appeared, but following its initial use 
by Hu Jintao, Chen Jiagang, working in a central Party think tank, argued the need for 
a shift from social management to social governance. In the atmosphere prior to the 
18th Party Congress, Chen discussed the problems of social management and listed 
what he saw as the primary obstacles to a substantive change to social governance. 
First, “social governance” (社会治理) is often twisted into the “governance of society” 
(治理社会), such that society is regarded as simply an object of management. Second, 
there is a prevalent view that the ultimate aim of social governance is maintaining 
stability. Stability, he argues, is achieved not by stifling but by removing obstacles, not 
by force, suppression, and crackdowns but by deliberation, debate and cooperation. 
Third, “social construction” (社会建设), essentially a top-down project to build, shape 
and develop society, should not be viewed as just a way to improve welfare but as a 
way to promote democracy. Combining Deng Xiaoping with Karl Marx, he argues 
that ultimately “the point of crossing the river by feeling the stones is to get from this 
bank to the other, from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom” (Chen 2012).  
After the Third Plenary Session in 2013, Zheng Hangsheng interpreted the shift 
from social management to social governance as a kind of innovative marriage 
between best international practice and “indigenous Chinese features” (2014). On the 
difference between the “ideal types” of social management and governance, he 
argued that management is top-down, semi-democratic and controlling due to the 
government’s dominant guiding role, whereas governance is both top-down and 
bottom-up, democratic, and includes diverse players, all of whom are equal (Zheng 
2014). This takes place under Party leadership and government guidance, which 
Zheng sees as the Chinese indigenous, and advantageous, part of social governance. 
 
3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to expand in detail on the concept of the “broader political 
atmosphere” but this is also something that can be understood better through analysis of central 
documents. For example, in the last few years the annual Government Work Report has contained an 
unprecedented amount of content about following the Party, e.g. the mandate to maintain Four 
Consciousnesses (四个意识). 
Giving an example of how this should work in practice, he explains social governance 
must involve residents’ self-governance to avoid being solely a top-down affair. But 
the model he suggests still seems to be government-led, with society playing a passive 
role: government must first teach residents how to self-govern and then press them to 
develop community self-governance (Zheng 2014). This is quite a contrast with Ma 
Qingyu’s interpretation of the official term social governance, which privileges 
creating space for social actors to use themselves (Ma 2017). Interestingly, while the 
contrast between the arguments of Zheng and Ma is stark, the language they use to 
develop their arguments is similar. This is likely in part a result of the atmosphere that 
the latter was writing in and the need that this created to word arguments subtly. 
Understanding their work fully requires us to pay careful attention to detail and 
excavate the key points from within thick layers of padding.    
Yan Jirong argues that “social governance” means both “the management and 
control of social affairs by government” and “social self-governance.” Yan sees the 
development in the discourse as a positive move by the state because society must 
now be regarded as one of the subjects of management rather than purely as an object. 
Yan argues the need for a “strong government, strong society” model to encourage “a 
society long-accustomed to being managed” to learn to manage itself and to stop the 
state from attempting to take everything on or leaving things unmanaged (Yan 2017).  
Within the patchwork of different interpretations, we find a kind of playing 
field on which scholars use the space created by the ambiguity of political discourse 
to tease out their own meanings in a kind of contentious wordplay. Some push with 
measured intensity, sensing the space available for interpretation in what law 
professor Ma Changshan likens to a high-wire act (Liu et al. 2013). 
Another approach in interpreting shifts in discourse is to attempt to address 
the political terms more directly. Perhaps the most direct statement on how “social 
governance” should be interpreted in the political discourse comes from Wang Puqu. 
Wang (2014b) argues that social governance includes three dimensions: government’s 
governance of society, government and society cooperating in the governance of 
society, and self-governance by society. The first is the most important, and the second 
and third are also closely linked to governance by government. Wang minces no 
words: “social governance” as the Party and government use it should be understood 
as “the governance of society” (2014b). Social governance, as it is used in the political 
discourse, is Party-led, mainly government-guided, and involves absorbing social 
organizations to participate (Wang 2014b).   
A third approach of interpretation is that by direct practitioners. Zhan Chengfu 
produced a report on social governance as part of a training course for provincial- and 
ministerial-level officials at the Central Party School. Zhan, already a member of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs’ Leading Party Members’ Group (党组) and head of the 
national Social Organization Management Bureau, was most recently made Vice-
Minister of Civil Affairs. Zhan wrote that some local Party committees are relaxing or 
diluting Party leadership over social governance and reported a growing trend among 
Party members in government when “faced with the reality of the growing diversity 
and pluralization of players involved in social governance” to “knowingly or 
unknowingly weaken Party leadership” (Zhan 2018).  
Zhan’s report addressed how, based on his interpretation of social governance, 
Party leadership should be exercised and executed by government. He argued the 
need for both “hard” and “soft” approaches, with the former including the governing 
body’s tough attitude, the severity of institutions, and the obligatory nature of the 
“rule of law methods” and the latter involving “ideological education” or “thought 
work,” “moral persuasion” and “typical cases to show the way.” Zhan cited common 
failures of social governance work by Party members, including a failure to act when 
faced with “erroneous trends in thinking”; a failure to “criticize or resist” the 
“unrealistic demands of the masses”; and a failure to do thought work among the 
masses (Zhan 2018). 
This report is a window onto one strain of thinking within the Party and, given 
Zhan’s role, within government. It shows how the Party’s use of “social governance” 
can be interpreted by someone charged with the national-level role of managing social 
organizations. The idea that “thought work” (思想工作) should be a technique of 
governance suggests that while the participants may be diverse, their views may not 
be pluralistic. Here, we see the tension that arises in practice between the officially 
recognized need to diversify the participants involved in “co-governance,” and the 
vague but non-negotiable notion that the Party must lead everything. This leads to 
more recent trends in official discourse on social governance since after the 18th Party 
Congress, which I now turn to.  
The importance of Party leadership is always a consistent theme, but since the 
18th and particularly the 19th Party congresses we find increasing emphasis on the 
notion that the Party leads everything in every field. How is this vague and 
intensifying call for Party leadership to be translated into practice in social governance? 
We know that “while the actors involved are already more pluralistic, among them 
the most important are the organizations of the Communist Party” (Yu 2018, 20). We 
know that in the “social governance setup” it is specifically Party committees that are 
to lead while no other actor “government, society, the public” is clearly specified. We 
also know that leadership by the Party is an incontrovertible precondition. Given this, 
if the concept of “leadership” is undefined, even nebulous, can social governance as a 
model embrace cooperation based on equal partnerships between multiple actors? 
An important example is the relationship between Party organizations and 
CSOs, with the involvement of the latter seen by many as pivotal in the change from 
social management to governance (Ma 2017; Tong and Yu 2011; Wang et al. 2014; Zhou 
2018). Recent drives in Party building have demanded Party cells be established in 
CSOs. Although this has long been required, new mechanisms are being created to 
make Party cell establishment necessary to the involvement of these organizations in 
social governance.4 We know that the Party is, to borrow from Patricia Thornton 
(2013), “advancing.” Yet the precise ways in which the Party is to “lead” and society 
is to “cooperate” remain ambiguous, and in part depend on the interpretation of actors 
putting vaguely-worded directives into action.    
A second important ambiguity relates to the “organic unity between Party 
leadership, the people as masters of their own houses, and the country being governed 
by law.” This involves the relationship between Party and the two main agencies of 
public power—the government and the people’s congresses. As Wang Changjiang 
puts it, “The Party leads everything, but the Party is a political organization not an 
agency of public power, and it can’t, as a single body, exercise public power...we still 
can’t say that we’ve found the most scientific way of linking [the Party and public 
power agencies]” (Wang 2018a). The 2018 “Deepening Party and State Agency Reform 
Plan” which, unlike previous state reform plans, deals with both Party and 
government, is a strong indicator of potential changes in the relationship between 
Party and government. Yet still there remains much ambiguity about how the 
leadership-responsibility relationship of the “social governance setup” is to work in 
practice. The relationship between the Party, the government, and the law is also 
changing, with deep implications for social governance in practice.   
Third, the Party is at once both the “vanguard of the Chinese people” and the 
leading organization in the social governance setup. In a liberal democratic political 
system, the relationship underpinning governance models is that between 
government and citizen. In contrast, underlying the official Chinese political concept 
of social governance is the relationship between the Party and the people. Here, “the 
people” refers to the political concept renmin, meaning not individuals but the 
people—or most of them—as a whole (Schoenhals 2007). In social governance there is 
a clear ambiguity in that there are no explicit boundaries or rights and responsibilities 
divided between Party and people as there might be between a government and its 
citizens. 
 
Interpretation and Implementation in Practice 
With these ambiguities or tensions in mind, I next examine three fundamental 
dimensions that shape scholars’ interpretations of social governance, and its 
implementation in practice: values, democracy, and law. 
A strain of literature which has gained less attention in relation to social 
governance in mainstream academia focuses on the Party’s mission of establishing 
 
4 For example, in some places, to be eligible to take on government contracts a social organization must 
have a three-star evaluation rating. Without sufficient Party building within the organization, it cannot 
be granted this rating. 
one set of Core Socialist Values as the single moral system to underpin governance. In 
December 2013, the Party’s General Office issued the “Opinion on Fostering and 
Practicing Core Socialist Values,” which includes a whole subsection on Core Socialist 
Values in economic development and social governance. A year later, the 18th Central 
Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session Resolution stated “National and social 
governance require law and virtue to play a joint role. We must grasp rule of law with 
one hand and rule by virtue with the other, [and] vigorously champion Core Socialist 
Values.” This might be seen as part of a wider project “to ensure that consensus to the 
state’s prescribed values is not undermined by competing discourses” and as 
ultimately “represent[ing] a shift in focus under the current Xi Jinping Administration 
to emphasize the superstructure over the economic base” (Gow 2017, 92).  
Scholars focusing on this question are often found within the Party school 
system. For example, at the Central Party School, as part of a research project entitled 
“A Study on Xi Jinping Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
on Social Governance” Ding Yuanzhu (2018) gives a comprehensive account of Xi’s 
remarks on social governance. This includes using the Core Socialist Values to guide 
“human feeling” (真情), which is at the heart of social governance, according to his 
understanding of Xi Thought on the matter (Ding 2018).  
From the local Party schools, Yin Hongyan gives an example of “a common 
problem in social governance” that can be solved by the Core Socialist Values: “When 
expropriating land and moving people off it for public infrastructure projects” some 
“are able to put the country’s interests first and feel it shameful to speak of interests” 
while others “think that because China is now a market economy, their private 
property is sacrosanct” (2014). Yin argues that fostering Core Socialist Values through 
social governance will bring individual needs into line with the objectives of society 
as a whole. This interpretation is echoed by Shang Yungang, who understands the 
Core Socialist Values to be a corrective to the issues arising from the pluralization of 
values. Shang’s interpretation is inspired in particular by the official call for social 
governance to “serve the overwhelming majority of the people” (2016). Here, we see 
the importance of the concept of renmin in understanding “social governance.” 
Outside of the Party school system, we also find the argument that the Core Socialist 
Values are an answer to the “difficulty” or “challenge” of increasingly pluralistic 
value systems in social governance (Li, Sun and Li 2015). Others see social governance 
as a means to actively champion the Core Socialist Values in order to solve this 
“problem” of pluralism (Yang and Wang 2015).   
A second fundamental dimension that underlies interpretations of the term 
social governance is its connection to democracy. Huang Weiping (2018) makes the 
important observation that since the 18th Party Congress, the Party leadership has 
begun to stress the Four Confidences—confidence in China’s own path, theory, 
system, and culture—effectively redefining “Chinese-style democracy” (Huang 2018, 
140). Huang contrasts the periods before and after the 18th Party Congress, and finds 
that during the pre-18th Congress period decision-makers were experimenting with 
primary-level elections, while in the post-18th Congress period the focus shifted to 
building primary-level governance systems and capacity. The 17th Party Congress 
Report stressed “democratic elections” first in a line-up of four forms of democratic 
practice—elections, decision-making, management, and oversight. After the 18th 
Congress, elections were viewed with increasing caution and instead the stress was 
shifted to the latter three, which, Huang argues, together form the Party’s notion of 
“democratic governance” at the primary level (2018). The weight of discourse on 
“democracy” has shifted away from a range of possibilities and toward democratic 
centralism and consultative democracy (Huang 2018). 
The third dimension of the context in which “social governance” is developing 
both in discourse and practice is the drive to “govern the country by law” (全面依法
治国). The central documents issued following the 18th Central Committee’s Fourth 
Plenary Session when this recent drive was launched make clear that Party leadership 
is essential to the “rule of law with Chinese characteristics.” 
In practice, government officials’ interpretations of this drive along with that 
to “strictly govern the Party”(从严治党 ) are crucial, and can threaten to thwart 
innovation in governance within government. Yang Xuedong (2017) warns that in the 
interpretations of some, these drives are conflated with increased supervision, 
blurring the boundaries between supervision and decision making. An environment 
has developed in which officials choose inaction when there is no existing legal basis 
for something; put initiatives superficially through the procedural paces; seek 
instruction higher up on every last thing; and are of the mentality that “the rafter that 
sticks out is the first to rot” (2017, 6). This prompts the pursuit of passable results and 
stability rather than genuine innovation in social governance (Yang 2017). If 
innovations in social governance are perceived to have gone awry, it falls on the 
leading government official. This means that the way government departments and 
their officials interpret these terms and their broader context is crucial, making the 
ambiguities discussed above all the more important.   
Meanwhile, the work of Liu Peifeng forces us to think about the effect of the 
combination of a nascent “rule of law with Chinese characteristics” with rule by man. 
Liu points out that while there is a positive side to the building up of the legal system, 
there is also another trend accompanying this drive. The litany of normative 
documents on subjects like consultative democracy, the united front system, and mass 
organizations show that “public power is moving deeply into society, and gradually 
becoming our leading technique for social governance…society is being squeezed and 
suppressed and internalized by public power (Liu 2018).  
In short, “normative documents” (Liu 2018), campaigns to accomplish 
“ideological education” and “thought work” (Zhan 2018), and sporadic “political 
tasks” as opposed to legally defined duties (Yang 2009), all threaten to undermine the 
rule of law and its bearing on social governance in practice. A dual approach seems 
to be evolving whereby the law is brought into play to “standardize” (Sun 2011) and 
restructure state-society relations (Tong and Yu 2011), but this is supplemented by 
rule by man (including rule by virtue) where perceived necessary. Meanwhile, the 
increasing use of law and institutionalization in general creates difficulties in practice 
for social actors as the space to innovate and the tacit allowance of non-legal CSOs is 
shrinking rapidly (Jia 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
The argument that social governance marks an elevation or improvement in 
thinking from social management is common in the Chinese literature. Interestingly, 
this is true both for those who argue that the concept demands greater freedom for 
social participation and for those who focus on stronger Party control. Crucial to 
remember is that in the Chinese political narrative, official discourse only ever moves 
forward, within the one-party system, former policy is rarely criticized in anything 
but the most roundabout way. This review finds that the individual political terms 
“social management” and “social governance” are not concrete concepts but are 
ambiguous and used in strategic rather than legal ways. Their use both over time and 
in relation to other concepts proves to be multidirectional and multi-layered, rather 
than clear, consistent and following a unidirectional linear flow toward a new model 
of governance. Given that what has become clear through this review is a lack of 
clarity, why examine central documents at all and not focus exclusively on practice? 
When examining individual concepts, both over time and within the broader 
context of central documents, words act as a lens to trace developing trends in 
thinking and conceptual shifts. The discourse also affects the rhythms of political 
practice, because when new documents are issued the onus is on all implicated parties 
to interpret new terms and study the “spirit” that underlies them.  
One of the most compelling arguments for a close examination of central 
documents is that it highlights contradictions and raises questions about assumptions 
that we may have formed using other methods such as interviews or reliance on 
scholarly analysis. It also shows the ambiguities that are perhaps where the crux of 
the answers, or at least the best questions, lie.   
By reviewing Chinese literature on these specific terms, we see the space for 
interpretation being given shape in practice, be it by advocating pluralist change 
through formal political channels or using interpretations to train cadres or CSO staff 
who will put concepts into practice. It is the vagueness, ambiguity, and contradictions 
of terms and their use that creates this space for actors to re-frame them. Using an art 
analogy, this space is less like positive space—the part within the sketch—and more 
like negative space—the space left over outside it. The “real” meaning of terms might 
never be clear; it is the space around them and its limits that must be understood by 
the interpreters. Engaging with the literature can help us to better understand this 
space. 
Finally, it is this same tension and ambiguity that allows terms to become a 
governance technique in their own right. The need to interpret ambiguous terms is an 
important element of governance itself. The role of political discourse in governing 
the governors is a topic that deserves serious attention. As Göbel and Heberer (2017) 
found in exploring the idea of governing officials with the imperative to “innovate,” 
the means of influencing officials’ behaviour can be hidden in places easily overlooked 
as bland or innocuous. Terms like “social governance” are, by nature of Chinese 
political language, slippery and demand interpretation, but interpretation relies on an 
actor’s understanding of an ever-expanding and shifting body of discourse. The trend 
toward institutionalization of campaigns to study political documents, such as the 
inclusion in the Party Constitution of the requirement to regularize “Two Studies, One 
Do” (两学一做), 5 shifts the dynamics of the interpretation game. It shrinks the space 
for error and dampens enthusiasm for pursuing possibilities in areas like social 
governance where innovation is demanded. Meanwhile, the institutionalization by 
inclusion in the Party Constitution of ambiguous “requirements” such as the “Four 
Consciousnesses” (四个意识)6 changes the environment for interpretation.  
This essay has found that the terms “social management” and “social 
governance” have different meanings depending on the context, the time, and the 
actor using them. The most interesting cases are those where their use differs between 
government and Party documents, between levels of government, and from 
administration to administration. The shift from “management” to “governance” 
cannot be understood as being indicative of a simple and coherent shift toward more 
pluralist forms of social governance. In fact, this essay argues that searching for clear, 
definite and static meanings of such terms is futile, and claiming that such meanings 
exist would be misleading.  
Analysis of central Party and government documents is an essential part of 
understanding Chinese politics. Tracing the longitudinal development of concepts 
across Party and government documents at different levels—which have different 
roles, interests, and challenges in interpreting them—can help us to understand how 
policy is developing and where areas of contention lie. It should not be a linear process 
that we are searching for, but the anomalies and contradictions that test our 
assumptions and findings from other methods. This can then be used in conjunction 
with a close reading of the Chinese academic literature, knowing that the latter can be 
 
5 To study the Party Constitution and regulations and Xi Jinping’s policy addresses, and to live up to 
Party standards. 
6 To maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and stay in 
alignment. First introduced in 2016 at a meeting of the Central Committee’s Political Bureau. 
used as a form of political participation, to better understand the “negative space” 
available for such interpretive exercises. In particular, under the present 
administration, such analysis demands greater patience and attention to detail to 
unearth the deeper layers of meaning in the interpretations of those actors who 
continue to tread the high-wire.      
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